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After America, Canada’s Moment?
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE OLD ORDER 
 
As Canadians, we are fortunate to live on one of the world’s safest pieces of real estate. Three 
oceans protect us from conflicts in Europe and Asia. Our only significant land border is with the 
United States, whose political, military and economic power once posed a mortal threat to 
Canada. Over the past century we have formed a close partnership that has sustained Canada’s 
security and prosperity for generations, and sustaining that partnership should be our only 
foreign imperative. But doing so requires that we help defend North America, and for sixty years 
we have done so through a binational command structure. This means that, when asked, we do 
our share to protect the western alliance from internal (think Suez Crisis, Cyprus) and external 
(think NATO’s reassurance mission, ISAF) threats.   
 
America’s post-war global hegemony has also benefited Canada far beyond the bilateral context. 
Canada has done well in the world America made.1 NORAD, NATO and the American nuclear 
force protected us from the threats that the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic oceans could not block. 
Rules-based trade liberalization through the GATT/WTO and global monetary stabilization 
through the IMF sustained the Canadian economy and headed off the temptations of 
protectionism at home and abroad. The U.S. Navy secured freedom of navigation, giving us low-
cost access to global markets. The UN and other multilateral forums have occupied the creative 
powers of our diplomatic class. Canada ventured abroad to help our allies and pursue our ideals. 
But these overseas engagements have rarely been imperative for our national security, and 
debates about them have never elected or defeated a government. 
 
The past decade has seen America’s global position suffer three major setbacks. The first, the 
bloody and expensive occupation of Iraq, which yielded nothing for the U.S. but more turmoil in 
the region and more demands for military help. The second, the invasion of Afghanistan, was 
supported by a broad coalition of nations and an undeniable casus belli. The invasion scattered 
al-Qaeda and freed Afghans from Taliban oppression. Yet, after more than a decade of casualties 
and foreign spending on a colossal scale, it is hard to say how much lasting progress has been 
made.2 The third, the 2008 economic crisis, revealed profound weaknesses in the American 
economy. The crisis was foretold through IMF statements about “global imbalances” that 
showed the piling on of both public and private debt in the US, and the piling up of massive 
foreign currency reserves in Asia,3 along with warnings about inadequate financial sector 
supervision. When it all came apart, the U.S. economy plunged into recession and a long period 
of painfully high unemployment, as predicted in the leading study of previous recessions 
triggered by financial sector crises.4 
 
America’s response to these three hits was, naturally, to turn inwards. The “to do” list for 
American authorities was daunting:  repair the country’s financial institutions; adjust the scale 
of social spending to fit reduced tax revenues; reinvigorate the U.S. economy’s dynamism, 
restoring its ability to add value; reduce America’s global financial and military footprints; and 
buy time to regain the national economic strength that had always underpinned America’s 
global strength. There was good reason to believe the U.S. could manage this daunting to do list. 
After all, American political leaders had faced similar challenges in the past.  
 
                                                            
1 Kagan, Robert. The World America Made. New York: Random House, 2013. 
2 Rose, Gideon and Tepperman, Jonathan. “A Hard Education,“ Foreign Affairs, 93.6 (2014) 2. 
3 For an up to date account, see Chapter 4, World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Cloud, Uncertainties. Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014. 
4 Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2009. 
 2 
 
After America, Canada’s Moment?
But in the wake of the 2008 crisis, America itself faltered. The U.S. political system was beset by 
profound conflict and disagreement. The scale of the crisis provoked deep partisan debates 
about the path ahead, but did not produce a consensus on how to respond. Washington 
eventually settled its budget debate through sequestration, imposing arbitrary and ill-targeted 
spending cuts across the board and forcing Pentagon planners to step away from their long-
desired capacity to fight two simultaneous wars.5 Meanwhile, America’s rivals were gaining 
strength. China’s economy powered ahead during the 2008 crisis, giving China both political 
and economic strength abroad. China’s economy is, or will soon be, larger than America’s,6 and 
China’s leaders are turning their economy’s overexposure to U.S. Treasuries into an 
international strength through frantic diversification. A new south-south economy of investment 
and trade emerged, one that by-passes the financial capitals of the north. Finally, in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis key American allies faced crises of their own. The UK’s severe recession forced it 
to abandon key enablers of its global ambitions.7  France, Germany and other Eurozone allies 
spent three crucial years putting their own economic house in order. 
 
These difficulties raise serious questions about the sustainability of U.S. power. Successive U.S. 
foreign policy missteps, including the pursuit of regime changes in Libya and Egypt without 
regard to the aftermaths, the famed “red line” retreat on chemical weapons in Syria, and the 
promise of a “pivot” to Asia based on the hope that the Middle East is no longer a threat to U.S. 
interests, have drawn attention to the trend. But the new constraints on America’s ability to 
influence world events go deeper and will last well past 2016. American scholars debate whether 
we have entered a “post-American” or G-zero world, but there is not much disagreement that the 
U.S. is losing its relative power to influence developments around the globe. 
 
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR CANADA?   
 
The past decade, by contrast, has seen Canada grow stronger economically. Our economy 
recovered more quickly from the 2008 crisis, but this recovery was only in the middle of the 
pack among G-20 and OECD countries, and has recently been overtaken by the US. Canada has 
seen consistent growth since 2009, growing steadily as others raced ahead and then faltered or 
stumbled and then grew more quickly. Our policy of protecting the Canadian banking sector 
certainly helped mitigate the economic downside to the 2008 crisis. That protectionism, 
combined with our strong energy and domestic resources helped insulate us from overseas 
turmoil. For the time being, Canada has domestic economic strength. 
 
On international security, despite important investments, the past decade has brought Canada 
closer to a day of reckoning on major capabilities. The 2007 Canada First Defence Strategy 
proposed to lighten Canada’s emphasis on projecting international power in favour of building 
domestic capabilities, notably in the Arctic.8 The government also used the Manley Panel’s 
report to set an end date for the previous government’s experiment in deploying a large 
Canadian ground force far afield in Afghanistan.9 Subsequent procurement choices for the navy 
and air force will, even if all goes well, leave gaps between the decommissioning of ships and 
                                                            
5 U.S. Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, 
DC, GPO, 2012. 
6 Subramanian, Arvind. Eclipse Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance. Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, 2011.  
7 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty the Strategic Defence and Security Review. London, UK: HM Government, 
2010.  
8 Canada First Defence Strategy. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2008. 
9 Manley, John. Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. Ottawa: Independent Panel on Canada's 
Future Role in Afghanistan, 2008. 
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planes and the delivery of their replacements.10  For the time being, these gaps have been made 
up for by a strong political willingness to deploy the forces that are left. Canada contributed 
army, navy and air forces to the NATO reassurance mission after the invasion of Crimea, a joint 
force response we could not mount after the invasion of Kuwait.11 The RCAF and Special Forces 
committed to halting the advance of the al-Baghdadi Caliphate have made important 
contributions. But the loss of at-sea replenishment capacity has already left the government with 
fewer choices in responding to crises. At some point, it will have even fewer choices given the 
age of the CF-18s and delays in acquiring stealth capabilities. 
 
Nonetheless, Canada’s place in the world has grown stronger compared to the U.S. since 2008. 
 
SO, IS THIS CANADA’S MOMENT? 
 
If Canada is now relatively stronger and the U.S. relatively weaker, is this Canada’s moment to 
extend our influence?  And if so, how and to what end? 
 
1. Our privileged geography gives us freedom to choose where and when we engage beyond 
North America. We have economic and strategic opportunities across both the Atlantic 
and Pacific. Our trade negotiators have pursued agreements for deeper economic 
integration with European and Asian countries at the same time. Both the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the EU and the TransPacific 
Partnership matter to our economic future.   
 
That freedom of choice means we have trouble committing to relationships other than 
the US. We blow hot and cold, our attention buffeted by transient domestic and 
international pressures. We are not European or east Asian, south Asian or Latin 
American, African or Middle Eastern. And the Asians, Latin Americans, Africans and 
Middle Easterners know it. The Europeans showed their understanding of our situation 
when they opted to elect other European countries rather than Canada to the UN 
Security Council in 2010. 
 
From time to time, commentators and economic strategists call on the federal 
government to create a comprehensive strategy for Asian engagement, often pointing to 
the very detailed strategy that Australia published in 2012.12 And, certainly, there is 
ample room for Canada to improve the strategic thinking behind its work in Asia.13  But 
our ability to sit at both the CETA and TPP tables at the same time is a strength, not an 
inability to prioritize. We do not need to be “all in” in Asia in the way Australia does. 
Australia does not have other choices. We do. 
 
                                                            
10 Sloan, Elinor. Canadian Defence Commitments: Overview and Status of Selected Acquisitions and Initiatives. 
Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2013, and [insert David Perry paper here], and Perry, David. 
The Growing Gap Between Defence Ends and Means: The Disconnect between the Canada First Defence Strategy and 
the Current Defence Budget. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2014.      
11 Maloney, Sean M. "“Missed Opportunity”: Operation Broadsword, 4 Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990–1991," 
Canadian Military History 4.1 (1995): 37-46. 
     
    
   
12 See, as a sample of the genre, Carney, Diana, “Australia’s Asian Century: Canada’s Too?” Blog post. News & Ideas, 
Canada2020. Posted Nov. 2, 2012, accessed December 1, 2014. Although see Peter Hartcher. The Adolescent Country. 
Sydney: The Lowy Institute, 2014. 
13 James, Patrick. Grand, Bland or Somewhat Planned?  Towards a Canadian Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region. 
Calgary: School of Public Policy, 2014. 
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Since there are so few geopolitical constraints to our foreign policy, Canada is free to 
pursue a democratic foreign policy. Canadian citizens with overseas roots press the 
government to vindicate important principles abroad when those principles are 
threatened. Just as Canada’s heroic contributions to the two world wars built on the 
European connections of our population at the time, today the Ukrainian and Sri Lankan 
connections of many Canadians gives our foreign engagement insight into the conflicts 
around the Black Sea and South Asia. Canadian leaders have been free to reflect 
legitimate concerns about Russian actions in Crimea. We do not need to worry about 
how that will impact our energy supplies and at the time of writing Canada has not paid a 
price for this position in the Arctic. Expressing legitimate concerns about the situation in 
Sri Lanka by boycotting the Commonwealth Summit did not harm any Canadian 
interests. The influence of diaspora communities on Canadian foreign policy is a 
measure of Canada’s strength not our weakness. 
 
2. The United States is unlikely to return to the “sole superpower” status it had from 1991 
until 2008. But, if it resolves its political dysfunction and puts its economic house in 
order, it can avoid the fate of severely diminished powers like the U.K. and France after 
the Suez Crisis.14 We are especially poorly equipped for a world without U.S. influence. 
International norms and multilateral forums are often frustrating to action-oriented 
leaders, but they are enabling factors for Canada’s success. 
 
3. With America’s influence shrinking, new clubs of emerging markets and upper middle 
income countries are acquiring increasing influence. While Canada’s international 
engagements are not hindered by a history as a colonial power,15 that fact alone does not 
make us part of the global south.  
 
The leaders of the global south are establishing south-south international institutions to 
reflect their economic power and Canada is simply not at those new tables. In our 
hemisphere, we are not invited to meetings of the Corporación Andina de Fomento, 
UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations) or CELAC (the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States) and certainly not to meetings of the ALBA (the 
Bolivarian Alliance). Further afield, we are not invited to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the Chiang Mai Multilateralization Initiative or the Eurasian Union. To be 
sure, some of these institutions have been struck to blunt the influence of institutions 
from the world America made. But that dynamic simply underscores how deeply Canada 
is embedded in the order of the global north. Even an organization of countries open to 
cooperating with the global north, like the Pacific Alliance, sees Canada as one of many 
northern nations hoping to join their ranks. It has put the issue of our membership on 
hold while its members see if they can form common cause with MERCOSUR, the 
ineffectual economic bloc of South America. 
 
Canadian policy makers have largely ignored the new clubs of the global south. We have 
instead preferred to admit a few new players to the clubs we find more comfortable (the 
G-20), or to deal with the southern members of clubs like the Commonwealth and La 
Francophonie. This has been a good holding strategy, but the efforts to build institutions 
of the global south are becoming more ambitious. The BRICS Bank and the Asian 
Infrastructure Bank are the first of what will likely be many south-south institutions that 
aim to be more than just talk shops. No one knows what these new institutions will 
become, but America’s inability to ratify reforms to the IMF and World Bank and has left 
                                                            
14 Subramanian, pp. 1-3, is a fantasy scenario. 
15 David Ljunggren. “Every G20 nation wants to be Canada, insists PM,” Reuters, Sep 25. 2009. 
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plenty of room for south-south institutions like the BRICS Bank’s to overtake the Bretton 
Woods institutions in innovation. This displaces the influence Canada exercises through 
these institutions.  
 
Canada, once a dependable 'joiner' of international clubs, is finding itself shut out of the 
newer, more dynamic institutions. 
 
POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 
How should Canada react to a new world of reduced American influence? 
 
For the foreseeable future, Canada will continue to benefit from our close partnership with the 
United States. The world America made, even if it is shrinking, will still be an important part of 
the globe’s affairs. In trade and commerce, Canada will enjoy low barriers to entry and low 
transaction costs within the American-dominated world. American security partnerships will 
continue to offer protection where Canada’s three oceans do not. 
 
Canada has two choices in confronting the south-south rewiring of global institutions. On the 
one hand, we can push harder to engage with south-south institutions that welcome our 
participation. Canada’s courting of the Pacific Alliance is important enough that we should 
remove any irritant that might make our membership bid unpalatable to any of the countries 
involved. We should be ready to start moving towards the free movement of workers between 
Canada and the countries of the Pacific Alliance. If we cannot form a closer partnership with the 
Pacific Alliance, it is hard to see how we can form closer links with the East Asian Summit or 
ASEAN.  
 
On the other hand, we should also renew our efforts to maximize the vitality of the north-south 
clubs we already belong to. For example, in our own hemisphere some countries are trying to 
debilitate the multilateral organizations that Canada belongs to – the Summit of the Americas, 
the Organization of American States, the IDB and the Caribbean Development Bank – in favour 
of the ones we do not – CELAC and ALBA. They intended to make the operation of the 
institutions we belong to so frustrating that Canada pulls back or pulls out of them. Yet, stepping 
away from these institutions would do nothing to advance Canada's interests, and would freeze 
us out of the major political forums on the hemisphere. All these institutions do useful work 
when Canada provides strong leadership. Without it, they wither and cede influence to 
organizations Canada does not influence. At the upcoming Summit of the Americas, due to be 
held in Panama, it would be encouraging to see Canada sidestep traps being set by others on the 
status of the Malvinas Islands and on drug policy and instead launch a renewal of our 
commitment to press freedoms or clean elections in the hemisphere.  
 
As America’s relative influence shrinks, we will have to overcome our inability to commit to 
relationships beyond the U.S. to make deeper and more enduring partnerships with other 
countries. We have many choices in the Americas, across the Pacific and across the Atlantic. 
Responding to calls for more strategic engagement in Asia or elsewhere by simply upping the 
pace of ministerial visits, or expanding trade relations, will not take us very far. The links 
created by ministerial visits and trade will be fleeting. We should instead proceed where there is 
sufficient depth of opportunity to forge a close partnership in political, strategic and economic 
realms.  
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